…We’ve implemented safety recommendations–Dana
The Accident Investigation Bureau (AIB), AIB has published the final reports of accidents/incidents involving Dana Air, Bristow Helicopters, OAS Helicopters and the incident involving the Presidential Implementation Committee on Maritime Safety and Security (PICOMSS) Diamond DA-42 aircraft.
Presenting the reports in Lagos, the commissioner of AIB, Mr. Akin Olateru attributed the causal factors for Dana Air accident of June 3, 2012 to the loss of engine power 17 minutes into the flight and on final approach, inappropriate omission of the use of the Checklist and the crew’s inability to appreciate the severity of the power related problem, their subsequent failure to land at the nearest suitable airfield as well as lack of situation awareness, inappropriate decision making, and poor airmanship.
On OAS Helicopters accident involving Ecuruiel A350B2 Helicopter with Registration 5N-BKA on Oke-Oba Hill, Ikonifin, Osun State July 29, 2011, the AIB commissioner said non-adherence of the pilot to visual flight rules of clear-of cloud and obstacles while maintaining ground contact at all times led to controlled flight into terrain was the major causal factor.
The other factors were that the pilot was not instrument rated besides that he was not familiar with the route
On the serious incident that involved Presidential Implementation Committee on Maritime Safety and Security (PICOMSS) Diamond DA-42 aircraft marked 5N-BKA at Benin Airport on July 5, 2012, Olateru the casual factor had to do with “the decision of the crew to continue the glide approach despite repeated landing gear warnings with the power lever below 25 per cent rather than initiating a co-around” .
He also said “the failure of the crew to recognize the landing gear warnings; no standard operating procedure/training policy in place; the crew low hours and experience, coupled with the rostering of two pilots with same capability on a training flight and lack of crew resource management training” contributed to the incident.
On the incident involving Bristow’s Sikorsky S-92 helicopter marked 5N-BKA at the Murtala Muhammed Airport in Lagos on February 27, 2013, the commissioner attributed it to the fact that “115v cable loom chafed and arced with hydraulic pipeline, puncturing it and causing a high pressure leak which ignited on contact with hot surface of the right hand heat exchanger, resulting in fire on the upper deck.”
Other causal factor were that “the effectivity of the aircraft was excluded in the alert service bulletin ASB No. 92-20-002A issued by the manufacturer” as well as the fact that “the Technical Directive TD-S92A-29-99 did not include check/inspection of the right hand side of the upper deck.”
AIB further gave recommendations on each of the accidents and incidents. In the case of Dana Air, eight safety recommendations were made.
Olateru said the safety recommendations previously made in the preliminary report published on September 5, 2012 were four in numbers wherein three were targeted to Dana Air and all were accepted and closed while one was to NCAA, accepted and closed.
There were four safety recommendations made in the published reports; 1.1. 1.2. 1.3. 1.4. 2; one of which is to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) targeting Pratt & Whitney the engine manufacturer; one to Dana Air; one to the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) (with 3 safety recommendations in one); and one to the Nigerian Airspace Management Agency (NAMA) on quality assurance management.
In the case of OAS, safety recommendations made in the published reports were 5; 1.1. 1.2. 1.3, three of which were targeted at NCAA; one to NAMA; and one to Nigeria Police Force.
On PICOMSS incident, there were two safety recommendations made in the published report 1.1. 1.2. 4, one to NCAA; and One was targeted to the Nigerian Police Force.
There were two safety recommendations made in this published report and both targeted to Bristow Helicopters.
However, Bristow Helicopters issued a Technical Directive, TD-S92A-29-104 following the incident with the subject: “Inspect LH and RH MGB, and Upper Deck Heat Exchanger Area, All 1, 2, and 3 system Hydraulic lines, Clamping all Components, and wiring Looms for any damage, chafing, or wear”.
Reacting to the report, Dana Air assured its clients of “our total commitment to their safety and comfort onboard our flights.”
The airline said in a statement shortly after AIB had released the final report that it started the implementation of the recommendations since 2013.
“Following the release of the final report of the June 3, 2012 Accident, we wish to state that Dana Air swung into action immediately the interim safety recommendations were released in 2013 and as an airline strictly committed to the safety and comfort of its guests, we implemented all the recommendations same year, as released by AIB.
“We did not stop at just implementing the recommendations; we also successfully passed an operational audit conducted by the NCAA’s Flight Safety Group and its foreign partners.
“In 2016, after another rigorous operational audit, Dana Air was admitted into the IOSA register to underscore its strict adherence to global management and safety standards and procedures required of global carriers. Also went further to win two awards from two reputable organizations for the redefining role it played in the aviation industry same year.
“While we acknowledge the full report, and will continue to review it, we are glad that the report confirmed that the aircraft was airworthy at the time of departure, flight crew was certified and that we have cleared all defects during their last check.
“The safety and comfort of our guests remains a top priority to us and may the beautiful souls of the crew and guests we lost at the unfortunate accident continue to rest in peace
“They remain forever in our hearts and our prayers and thoughts will continue to be with their friends and loved ones,” said the airline.
